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Abstract: This paper examines key trends and developments in information technology, and the 
implications of those developments on stability and security.  Focus is on cyber threats to 
computer networks, including information theft and sabotage, and acts that disrupt or deny 
services.  Seven trend areas are examined: ubiquity, mobility, hacking tools, performance, 
vulnerabilities, groundedness, and information security.  Trends in these areas are related to an 
increase in the number and severity of cyber-related security incidents, and the potential to cause 
considerable damage.  The paper also examines the prospects for the future, particularly the 
threat of cyber terrorism.  Finally, it summarizes initiatives and recommendations for improving 




Like many other technologies, information technology can be used both to promote stability and 
security and to threaten the same.  On the positive side, it can be used to disseminate and 
exchange ideas and strategies for security, to gather support for peace missions and security 
programs, and to implement and coordinate security plans and operations.  It has played an 
important role, for example, in the international campaign to ban land mines and is used by 
governments and their citizens to foster peace and security throughout the world.  It is a critical 
element of all government security operations, from intelligence collection to command and 
control.  It is used to hunt down terrorists and implement border controls. 
 
On the negative side, information technology can be attacked and exploited in ways that threaten 
stability and security.  An adversary can jam or take down computer and communications 
systems with physical weapons such as bombs, missiles, and electromagnetic weapons; use mass 
media to propagate lies to the entire world; and penetrate or attack computer networks for the 
purpose of stealing secret information or sabotaging data and systems.   
 
This paper will focus on the later aspect of information technology, specifically on cyber threats 
to computer networks.  These threats involve operations that compromise, damage, degrade, 
disrupt, deny, and destroy information stored on computer networks or that target network 
infrastructure. They include computer intrusions and the use of network “sniffers” to eavesdrop 
on network communications.  They include the use of malicious software, namely computer 
viruses, worms, and Trojan horses.  They include denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that halt or 
disrupt the operation of networked computers, usually by flooding them with traffic, and Web 





Cyber attacks can be conducted to support a nation’s defense.  For example, a government might 
eavesdrop on network communications to gather intelligence about terrorists or others who 
threaten their security, or it might jam or disrupt an enemy’s network during a time of conflict.  
In these cases, the attacks are employed to strengthen national security, at least of the state 
conducting the operations. 
 
Because the focus here is on information technology-related threats to stability and security, we 
will consider mainly attacks that threaten the security of the United States or its citizens or allies, 
or that more generally threaten stability and peace in the world.  We will not explore U.S. 
government-sponsored cyber attacks conducted for the purpose of national security. 
 
We will also focus on the Internet and private networks (intranets and extranets) that use the 
suite of protocols based on the Internet Protocol (IP). Although there are other types of networks, 
many of these have been or will be replaced by IP networks to save costs and provide 
interoperability.  
 
The paper first reviews trends and developments in information security incidents, showing that 
the situation has been and continues to be a growing problem.  It then examines information 
technology trends and developments, and how they are contributing to the growing rate of 
security incidents.  Next, it considers the prognosis for the future.  Finally, it considers policy 
recommendations for addressing the threat. 
 
INCIDENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Although data on cyber security incidents is sparse, by most if not all accounts, the number and 
severity of incidents is increasing.  For example, the Computer Emergency Response Team 
Coordination Center (CERT/CC) based at the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute 
has published data showing a dramatic increase in incidents reported to them during the past few 
years. The number of incidents rose from 2,134 in 1997 to 21,756 in 2000.  Almost 35,000 
incidents have been reported to CERT/CC during the first three quarters alone of 2001.1  The 
significance of these numbers becomes even more apparent when one realizes that many, 
perhaps most, incidents are never reported to CERT/CC, or indeed to any third party.  Further, 
each incident that is reported corresponds to an attack that can involve hundreds or even 
thousands of victims.  For example, when a hacker defaces hundreds of Web sites at once or a 
computer worm invades several hundred thousands Web servers as it propagates, this is regarded 
as a single incident.   
 
The Department of Defense has indicated a similar increase in incidents reported to its Joint 
Task Force Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO).  The number of events against DoD 





Defacements of Web sites have increased dramatically.  Attrition.org, which recorded mirrors of 
defaced Web pages until spring 2001, received reports of 37 defacements in 1997.  By 2000, this 
number was up to 5,822.  Like the CERT/CC data, these numbers do not represent all 
defacements, and the numbers in 2001 could easily be on the order of several hundred per day.  
A few incidents have involved mass defacements of thousands or even tens of thousands of Web 
sites. 
 
Rather than modifying a Web site directly, an attacker can apply a “DNS hack.”  This involves 
tampering with an Internet server that manages the Domain Name Service (DNS), which is 
responsible for mapping domain names (e.g., georgetown.edu) to IP addresses (numbers).  The 
attacker modifies the mapping so that Internet traffic is redirected to the attacker’s own Web site, 
where the desired messages are displayed. 
 
The prevalence of computer viruses and worms has been increasing for the past several years.  
Message Labs, which scans its clients’ e-mail for viruses, reported that 1 in 1,400 messages had 
a virus in 1999.  The infection rate doubled to 1 in 700 in 2000 and then more than doubled to 1 
in 300 in 2001. 3  ICSA.net (now TrueSecure) also has reported an increase in infection rate, 
from 10 computers per 1,000 in 1996 to 90 computers per 1,000 in 2000.4
 
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, which until a few years ago were relatively unheard of, are now 
commonplace.  A study conducted at the Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis 
(CAIDA) at the University of San Diego Supercomputer Center observed about 12,000 attacks 
against 5,000 different targets during a three-week period in February 2001.5
 
Fraud and extortion are also common.  In March 2001, the FBI announced that ongoing 
computer hacking by organized criminal groups in Russia and the Ukraine had resulted in the 
theft of more than 1 million credit card numbers.  The numbers had been taken from 40 U.S. 
computer systems associated with e-commerce and e-banking companies in 20 states.  After 
successfully hacking into a company, the Eastern European groups than attempted to extort the 
company, offering services to solve the computer vulnerability.6
 
Many attacks are extremely costly.  According to Computer Economics of Carlsbad, California, 
the ILOVEYOU virus and variants, which crippled computers in May 2000, was estimated to 
have cost $8.5 billion in damage, vastly exceeding the damages from any previous virus.  In July 
and August 2001, the Code Red worm infected about a million servers and caused another $2.6 
billion in damages, they reported.  In April 2001, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
announced it had shut down an online banking fraud worth an estimated $3.9 billion. Victims 
were duped by bogus get-rich-quick schemes involving fake documents.7
  
Beginning in 1996, the Computer Security Institute and FBI have conducted a survey of CSI’s 
members about computer crime incidents.  Each year, about 500 companies have responded.  In 
2001, the reported losses were $378 million, up from $266 million in 2000 and $124 million in 




A global survey conducted by InformationWeek and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP in 2000 
estimated that computer viruses and hacking took a $1.6 trillion toll on the worldwide economy 
that year.  The cost to the United States alone was an estimated $266 billion, or more than 2.5% 
of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
 
Computer-related security incidents threaten the national and global economy.  In addition to 
causing direct financial losses, they can erode public confidence in e-commerce and technology 
in general. Attacks against military systems can affect national security, particularly if they 
compromise classified information or impact important military operations.  Attacks against 
critical infrastructures, such as those used to provide power or water, can have potentially 
devastating consequences on our daily lives.  Although cyber attacks against these 
infrastructures have so far been limited, the potential for serious harm is real. 
 
TECHNOLOGY TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 
 
The growing threat from cyber attacks can be attributed to trends and developments in 
information technology.  This section reviews seven trend areas: ubiquity, groundedness, 




Information technology is becoming increasingly pervasive and connected.  It is spreading 
throughout the world, in both our homes and workplaces.  It is integrated into everything from 
appliances and vehicles to processes and infrastructures.  Automation and connectivity are 
growing in leaps and bounds, aided by advances in computing and telecommunications 
technology.  Much of the growth and connectivity is taking place on the Internet and the private 
IP networks operated by organizations and their extended enterprises.   
 
This trend toward ubiquitous computing is exacerbating the challenges of information security. 
There are more perpetrators, more targets, and more opportunities to exploit, disrupt, and 
sabotage systems.  There are more Web sites with information and tools for attacking 
information and systems. 
 
The impact is partially illustrated by the rapid and widespread propagation of computer viruses 
and worms.  The ILOVEYOU virus, mentioned above, infected the personal computers of tens 
of millions of users worldwide.  All a recipient had to do to activate the virus was open an e-mail 
message containing the virus as an attachment.  Once activated, the virus spread through e-mail 
to all of the persons listed in the user’s address book. 
 
The Code Red worm, which spread from one Internet computer server to another without any 
human intervention, reached hundreds of thousands of machines before it’s rate of proliferation 
abated.  During a single14-hour period on July 19, 2001, CAIDA observed the infection of over 
359,000 computers.  While 43% of these were in the United States, countries all over the world 




The worm propagated by scanning the Internet for systems that had a particular vulnerability that 
was common to many machines.  When it found one, it copied its code to the new victim.  In 
addition, it launched a denial-of-service assault against the Internet address for the White House 
by bombarding it with traffic (which the White House averted by changing its IP address).  
Although many victims eradicated the worm and repaired their machines, others did not, 
contributing to its spread.  Further, variants of the worm that exploited other vulnerabilities 
appeared with the potential of causing even greater harm. 
 
Another impact of the spread of technology is that cyber attacks can come from almost anywhere 
in the world.  Neither distance nor geography is a factor.  An attacker in China, for example, can 
penetrate a system in the United States, and then use that as a launching pad to attack a system in 
Japan.  It is not unusual for hackers to “loop” through computers in multiple targets on their way 
to their ultimate target.  This conceals their tracks and makes investigations extremely difficult, 
because it requires cooperation from law enforcement agencies and service providers in all 
countries involved. 
 
There have been numerous incidents of attackers gaining access to U.S. military computers.  For 
example, before and during the Gulf War, hackers from the Netherlands penetrated computer 
systems at 34 American military sites on the Internet, including sites that were directly 
supporting Operation Desert Storm/Shield.  They browsed through files and obtained 
information about the exact location of U.S. troops, the types of weapons they had, the 
capabilities of the Partriot missile, and the movement of American warships in the Gulf region.  
According to some sources, the hackers tried to sell the pilfered information to Iraq, but their 
offer was declined.9  A few years earlier, German hackers did successfully sell documents taken 
from DoD computers to the KGB.10  More recently, hackers located in Russia have been 
snooping through Defense Department computers for the past several years.  The investigation, 
originally code-named “Moonlight Maze” but subsequently changed to “Storm Cloud,” 
apparently has yet to determine whether the spies are operating on behalf of the Russian 
government or some other entity. 
 
Although no break-ins have been attributed to terrorists, the Detroit News reported in November 
1998 that Khalid Ibrahim, who claimed to be a member of the militant Indian separatist group 
Harkat-ul-Ansar, had tried to buy military software from hackers who had stolen it from DoD 
computers they had penetrated.  Harkat-ul-Ansar had declared war on the United States 
following the August cruise-missile attack on a suspected terrorist training camp in Afghanistan 
run by bin Laden, which allegedly killed nine of their members.11
   
Another effect of the spread of information technology is that many conflicts in the world now 
have a cyberspace component.  For example, as Palestinian rioters clashed with Israeli forces in 
the fall of 2000, Arab and Israeli hackers took to cyberspace to participate in the action. 
According to the Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, the cyberwar began in October, shortly after 
the Lebanese Shi’ite Hezbollah movement abducted three Israeli soldiers. Pro-Israeli hackers 
responded by crippling the guerrilla movement’s Web site, which had been displaying videos of 
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Palestinians killed in recent clashes and which had called on Palestinians to kill as many Israelis 
as possible. Pro-Palestinian hackers retaliated, shutting down the main Israeli government Web 
site and the Israeli Foreign Ministry Web site. From there the cyberwar escalated. An Israeli 
hacker planted the Star of David and some Hebrew text on one of Hezbollah’s mirror sites, while 
pro-Palestinian hackers attacked additional Israeli sites, including those of the Bank of Israel and 
the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.  In addition to Web defacements, hackers launched denial of 
service attacks against Internet service providers and other sites. The attacks continued for many 
months following.  In January 2001, iDefense reported that over 40 hackers from 23 countries 
had hit the Web sites of 8 governments as well as numerous commercial sites.12  
 
According to iDefense, some of the pro-Palestinian attackers had connections to terrorist 
organizations.  One of these was UNITY, a Muslim extremist group with ties to Hezbollah.  The 
hackers launched a coordinated, multi-phased denial of service attack, first against official Israeli 
government sites, second against Israeli financial sites, third against Israeli ISPs, and fourth, 
against “Zionist E-Commerce” sites.  The other group, al-Muhajiroun, was said to have ties with 
a number of Muslim terrorist organizations as well as bin Laden.  The London-based group 
directed their members to a Web page, where at the click of a mouse members could join an 
automated flooding attack against Israeli sites that were attacking Moqawama (Islamic 
Resistance) sites.  iDefense also noted that UNITY recruited and organized a third group, Iron 
Guard, which conducted more technically sophisticated attacks.  According to a Canadian 
government report, the group’s call for cyber jihad was supported and promoted by al-
Muhajiroun.13
 
Hackers protesting the September 11 terrorist attack against the United States have taken to the 
Internet to voice their rage.  One hacker, “Fluffi Bunny” redirected tens of thousands of Web 
sites to one with a rant about religion and the message “If you want to see the Internet again, 
give us Mr. bin Laden and $5 million dollars in a brown paper page. Love, Fluffi B.”14  Another 
group called the Dispatchers, has defaced hundreds of Web sites and launched denial of service 
attacks.  Led by a 21-year-old security worker “Hackah Jak” from Ohio, the group of 60 people 
worldwide announced they would destroy Web servers and Internet access in Afghanistan and 
target nations that support terrorists. Their targets have included the Iranian Ministry of Interior, 
the Presidential Palace of Afghanistan, and Palestinian ISPs.15  A third group, called Young 
Intelligent Hackers Against Terror (YIHAT), said they penetrated the systems of two Arabic 
banks with ties to bin Laden, although officials from the banks denied any security breaches 
occurred.  The group, which says their mission is to stop the money sources of terrorism, issued 
a plea to corporations to make their networks available to group members for the purpose of 
providing the electronic equivalent of a terrorist training camp.16
 
While condemning the September 11 attacks, one group of Muslim hackers, GForce Pakistan, 
said they stood by bin Laden.  “Osama bin Laden is a holy fighter, and whatever he says makes 
sense,” one of their Web defacements read.  The modified Web page warned that the group 
planned to hit major US military and British Web sites and proclaimed an “Al-Qaeda Alliance 
Online.”  Another GForce defacement contained similar messages along with images of badly 
mutilated children who had been killed by Israeli soldiers.17  
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Web defacements and denial of service attacks have accompanied numerous other real-world 
conflicts and events, including the Kosovo conflict, the conflict in Kashmir, and various 
incidents involving China. The enthusiastic hackers may be motivated as much by their desire to 
impress their peers and the fun and challenge of it all as by their patriotism.  Often, they direct 
their attacks against each other.  Fluffi Bunni, for example, apparently defaced YIHAT’s Web 
site. After suffering denial-of-service attacks as well, YIHAT announced they were moving 
underground. 
 
So far, terrorists have been implicated in only a couple of computer attacks, and none of them 
were particularly damaging.  In addition to the terrorist connections mentioned above, an 
offshoot of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was said to be responsible for an e-
mail bombing against Sri Lankan embassies over a two-week period in 1998.  The group 
swamped Sri Lankan embassies with thousands of electronic mail messages, in what some 
intelligence agencies characterized as the first computer attack by terrorists.  The messages read 
AWe are the Internet Black Tigers and we=re doing this to disrupt your communications.”18
 
Although terrorists have not engaged in many cyber attacks, they are using the Internet 
extensively to communicate and coordinate their activities.  For example, some of the 19 
hijackers involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon exchanged e-mail messages in a mix of English and Arabic.19  In addition, they used 
the Web to find information about crop dusters and to book airline tickets.  As early as 1996, the 
Afghanistan headquarters of bin Laden was equipped with computers and communications 
equipment.  Egyptian “Afghan” computer experts were said to have helped devise a 




Cyberspace, and the Internet specifically, is often viewed as a virtual world that transcends space 
and time, a world without borders and, by implication, border guards.  This view has never been 
completely accurate, as computers reside in a physical world where laws apply, and many 
countries control access to the Internet or filter incoming e-mail and access to Web sites.  Still, it 
has had a ring of truth, as bits generally flow freely through the Internet without regard to 
geography and the physical world.  It was particularly true in the early days of the Internet (then 
ARPANET), when the net was used by researchers for e-mail, file transfer, and remote login to 
super computers. 
 
Over time, computer networks became increasingly integrated into real world processes.  Now, 
these networks play a critical role in practically every sector of the economy and government 
operation.  Thus, attacks on these networks have real-world consequences.  Governments are 
particularly concerned with terrorist and state-sponsored attacks against the critical 
infrastructures that constitute their national life support systems.  The Clinton Administration 
defined eight: telecommunications, banking and finance, electrical power, oil and gas 





There have been numerous attacks against these infrastructures.  Hackers have invaded the 
public phone networks, compromising nearly every category of activity, including switching and 
operations, administration, maintenance, and provisioning (OAM&P).  They have crashed or 
disrupted signal transfer points, traffic switches, OAM&P systems, and other network elements.  
They have planted “time bomb” programs designed to shut down major switching hubs and 
disrupted emergency 911 services throughout the eastern seaboard.21
 
In March 1997, one teenage hacker penetrated and disabled a telephone company computer that 
serviced the Worcester Airport in Massachusetts.  As a result, telephone service to the Federal 
Aviation Administration control tower, the airport fire department, airport security, the weather 
service, and various private airfreight companies was cut off for six hours.  Later in the day, the 
juvenile disabled another telephone company computer, this time causing an outage in the 
Rutland area.  The lost service caused financial damages and threatened public health and public 
safety.22
 
Banks and financial systems are a popular target of cyber criminals.  The usual motive is money, 
and perpetrators have stolen or attempted to steal tens of millions of dollars.  In one case of 
sabotage, a computer operator at Reuters in Hong Kong tampered with the dealing room systems 
of five of the company=s bank clients.  In November 1996, he programmed the systems to delete 
key operating system files after a delay long enough to allow him to leave the building.  When 
the “time bombs” exploded, the systems crashed.  They were partially restored by the next 
morning, but it took another day before they were fully operational.  However, the banks said the 
tampering did not significantly affect trading and that neither they nor their clients experienced 
losses.23
 
An overflow of raw sewage on the Sunshine Coast of Australia in early 2000 was linked to a 49-
year-old Brisbane man, who allegedly penetrated the Maroochy Shire Council’s waste 
management system and used radio transmissions to alter pump station operations.  A million 
litres of raw sewage spilled into public parks and creeks on Queensland’s Sunshine Coast, killing 
marine life, turning the water black, and creating an unbearable stench.  A former employee of 
the company that had installed the system, the man was angry after being rejected for a council 
job.24  
 
Computer viruses and worms have disrupted operations on systems used to coordinate and 
control the business processes associated with critical infrastructures.  The Code Red worm, for 
example, was responsible for the delay of 55 Japan Airlines flights on August 9, 2001.  The 
computer shut down caused by the worm affected ticketing and check-in-services for the carrier 
and its affiliates.25  Earlier, the FBI arrested a hacker in Houston for plotting to launch a worm 
that could have shut down 911 services by forcing the infected computers to dial 911.  





Increasingly, IP networks are grounded in the physical world through network-connected sensors 
and actuators. Web-based portals are being developed for people, objects, places, events, and 
processes, as well as the usual document collections. These portals can provide access to 
cameras and other types of sensors, actuators, and controls, allowing one to view and alter the 
physical world, and to determine where devices are located.  They can be used to control 
satellites, vehicles, robots, and other objects.   
 
According to Federal Computer Week, the U.S. Air Force is requiring that all command and 
control systems and weapons systems be Web-enabled using commercial technologies.27  The 
motivation is improved access to data and lower costs.  Doing so, however, could expose these 
systems to greater risks.  
 
Many other critical infrastructures are or will be controlled through networks that use Internet 
protocols.  For example, a Midwest Independent System Operator (ISO) will use an IP-based 
network to monitor and control the transmission of electrical power from independent power 
producers throughout a 14-state area in the Midwest.28  Similar ISOs exist in other regions of the 
country, and in spring 2001, hackers penetrated the development system of the California ISO.  
Although the system was used only for testing and not production, the security breach, which 
lasted for 17 days, raised concerns about the security of the networks used to control energy 
distribution. 
 
The impact of all these developments is that cyber attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in IP 
networks will have real-world consequences, beyond the basic costs and inconveniences they 
already incur.  They could seriously endanger lives and the environment.  Information security 
will become increasingly important, not only to protect information and systems, but to protect 
life itself.  Most of the attacks today involve personal computers and Internet servers, but 
tomorrow’s attacks could involve automobiles, wearable devices, and Internet appliances, with 




Information and information technology has become increasingly mobile.  People and devices 
can be anywhere and they can move.  Software and data can be stored and transmitted anywhere 
and at any time through electronic mail, the Web, and peer-to-peer sharing.  
 
Mobility has generally made the task of protecting information more difficult.  It has extended an 
organization’s network security perimeter from the workplace to homes, airports, and hotel 
rooms.  Information once confined to office networks can make its way to home PCs, laptop 
computers, and handheld devices, which may be less protected physically.  Each year, tens of 
thousands of laptops are reported lost or stolen, many with extremely sensitive information, 
including government classified information.   
 
After John Deutch retired as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in 1996, the CIA found 
classified information on the computer he had been given to use at home. The computer, which 
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had been designated for unclassified use only, had been used to access the Internet, Deutch's 
bank, and Department of Defense computers.29  Although no evidence showed that any 
information had been compromised, the potential for compromise by a foreign intelligence 
service was certainly present. 
 
Mobile software poses a major security challenge.  Computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and 
other forms of malicious code can and do enter computers through e-mail, the Web, and other 
Internet portals.  They account for a substantial portion of all computer security incidents and 
can spread at alarming rates.   
 
Wireless communications allow small, battery-operated devices to tie into computer networks.  
These may be vulnerable to a new type of denial-of-service attack, namely one that attempts to 




The tools and methods used to attack computer networks have been getting more abundant.  
They are readily acquired from numerous Web sites in countries all over the world. Typing 
“hacking tools” into one Internet search engine yielded 42,012 hits in March 2000.  By 
September 2001, the same search engine yielded 158,000.  By some estimates, there are now 
over 60,000 computer viruses alone.  For a few dollars, anyone can buy a disk with thousands of 
them.   
 
Testifying before the House Science Subcommittee on Technology on June 24, 1999, Ray 
Kammer, Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), said “One 
popular site has over 400,000 unique visitors per month downloading attacks.  We estimate that 
at least 30 computer attack tools per month are written and published on the Internet.”  NIST 
also examined 237 attack tools and found that 20% could remotely penetrate network elements 
and that 5% were effective against routers and firewalls.31
 
Attack tools have become more powerful as developers build on each other’s work and program 
their own knowledge into the tools.  The Nimda worm combines features from several previous 
viruses and worms in order to create a powerful worm that spreads by four channels: e-mail, 
Web downloads, file sharing, and active scanning for and infection of vulnerable Web servers.  
The e-mail component automatically e-mails itself to addresses in the victim’s address book. 
 
The advanced distributed denial of service tools have sophisticated command and control 
capabilities.  The attacker runs client software to direct the actions of server software running on 
potentially thousands of previously compromised “zombie” computers.  In February 2000, a 
Canadian teenager calling himself Mafiaboy used zombies at universities in California and 
elsewhere to launch a costly DDoS attack against Yahoo, CNN, eBay, and other e-commerce 
Web sites.  Computer worms like Code Red can be used to compromise potential zombies and 
install the server software needed for such attacks.  Upon installation, they can “report in” to a 




Many attack tools are simple to use.  “Script kiddies” and others with malicious intent but little 
skill can download the tools and launch destructive attacks without even understanding how the 
tools work.  E-mail worms can be constructed with windows-based software such as the VBS 
Worm Generator.  All the attacker needs to do is type in a subject line and message body for the 
e-mail message carrying the worm and check a few boxes. 
 
Many of the tools support mass attacks against a single target or against multiple targets 
simultaneously.  The computers involved in these attacks may be compromised themselves, as in 




Information technology is getting smaller, faster, cheaper, and more powerful.  Processor speeds 
are doubling approximately every 18 months according to Moore=s law.  This yields a factor of 
10 improvement every 5 years and a factor of 100 improvement every 10.  Storage capacity is 
increasing at a somewhat faster rate, doubling about every 12 months, and network capacity is 
growing still faster, doubling approximately every 9 months. 
 
One implication of these performance trends is that spies can download secret documents faster 
and from repositories that are getting larger.  Those with high-speed Internet access can acquire 
megabytes of information in just a few seconds. 
 
Computer viruses and worms can spread quickly over high-speed Internet connections.  During 
the peak of its infection frenzy, the Code Red worm infected more than 2,000 computers per 
minute.32  A researcher at the University of California at Berkeley showed how a “Warhol 
Worm” could infect all vulnerable servers on the Internet in 15 minutes to an hour.  Researchers 
at Silicon Defense took the concept further, showing how a “Flash Worm” could do it in thirty 
seconds.33
 
At the same time, high bandwidth data pipes and increased network traffic can make it more 
difficult to monitor networks for intrusions and other forms of abuse and to intercept particular 
traffic in support of a criminal investigation or foreign intelligence operation.  Similarly, it can 
be harder to scan disks for viruses and other forms of malicious code and to conduct computer 
forensics examinations if more data is stored. 
 
The relative lag of processor improvements to those of storage and networks could aggravate the 
challenges, although multiprocessor supercomputers and distributed computing can be used to 
compensate.  A distributed approach is already used by many network-based intrusion detection 
systems and to break encryption keys in criminal investigations.  Breakthrough processor 
technologies such as quantum and DNA computing might also counter the lag, but these 
technologies represent long-term solutions and also benefit the opponent an advantage in code 
breaking. If network traffic grows faster than storage capacity, long-term retention of logs that 






Information technology is growing in complexity, owing to advances in technology and software 
development and the growing number of components to build upon.  Systems are larger and have 
increasing numbers of components, features, and interactions.  Many feature interactions are not 
anticipated. 
 
This growing complexity has made it extremely difficult to develop and deploy information 
technology products that are free of vulnerabilities.  Even if a particular component is hardened 
against attack, the component may interact with new or upgraded components in ways that 
introduce new vulnerabilities.  Experience has shown time and again that it is impossible to 
eliminate all vulnerabilities from computer systems despite our best efforts to the contrary.  Even 
our most trusted firewalls and other security products have been found to have weaknesses.  
Nothing seems to be immune. 
 
Indeed, the number of vulnerabilities in software products reported to CERT/CC has increased in 
recent years, from 262 in 1998 to 1,090 in 2000.  In the first three quarters of 2001, they received 
reports of 1,820 vulnerabilities, or more than 6 per day. 
 
Even if products are secure, they can be configured or used in ways that are not.  Users can pick 
weak passwords and system administrators can fail to install security patches.  In September 
2001, the SANS (System Administration, Networking, and Security) Institute and FBI issued a 
report identifying the top 20 Internet vulnerabilities.34  At the top of the list was default installs 
of operating system and applications.  Functions were enabled that were not needed and had 
security flaws.  Second on the list was accounts with no passwords or weak ones. 
 
The JTF-CNO found that the vast majority of reported intrusions into Defense Department 
computers exploited known vulnerabilities that were easily prevented.  Major General James D. 
Bryan, commander of the office, noted that some employees failed to pick strong passwords, the 
most common password being “password.”35
 
Many federal government systems remain insecure despite initiatives to fortify them from attack. 
Testifying before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs following the terrorist attacks 
against the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the General Accounting Office (GAO) noted that 
“independent audits continue to identify persistent, significant information security weaknesses 
that place virtually all major federal agencies' operations at high risk of tampering and 
disruption.”36  The GAO further noted: “An underlying deficiency impeding progress is the lack 
of a national plan that fully defines the roles and responsibilities of key participants and 
establishes interim objectives. Accordingly, we have recommended that the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs ensure that the government's critical infrastructure 
strategy clearly define specific roles and responsibilities, develop interim objectives and 





As information systems become “smarter” and more “like us,” they may also become more 
vulnerable to attack.  Humans are riddled with vulnerabilities.  We can be robbed, killed, 
deceived, and bribed.  Intelligent software agents may exhibit similar vulnerabilities as they 
mimic their human counterparts.  There is really no reason to believe that smarter systems will 
necessarily mean increased security. 
 
The bottom line is that we will never have secure systems. The underlying technology will 
always have vulnerabilities and people will make mistakes.  Further, insiders with access to 
information will commit intended acts of espionage and sabotage.  Thus, an important 





Security technologies have advanced considerably in such areas as cryptography, biometrics, 
intrusion detection, anti-viral protection, decoy environments, vulnerability scanning, and 
incident response.  In addition, companies now offer managed security services, including 
remote monitoring for vulnerabilities and intrusions.  While these advances have no doubt 
helped ward off numerous attacks, overall they have not kept up with the rising threat, as 
witnessed by the incident data presented earlier. 
 
Security technologies, particularly those that hide information, have also been a boon to 
criminals and terrorists.  In March 2000, George Tenet, then Director of Central Intelligence, 
reported that “terrorist groups, including Hizballah, HAMAS, the Abu Nidal organization, and 
Bin Ladin's al Qaeda organization are using computerized files, e-mail, and encryption to 
support their operations.”37  Ramsey Yousef, an associate of bin Laden and member of the 
international terrorist group responsible for bombing the World Trade Center in 1994 and a 
Manila Air airliner in late 1995, used encryption to hide details of further terrorist attacks, 
including plans to blow up eleven U.S.-owned commercial airliners in the Far East.  Wadith El 
Hage, another bin Laden associate, who was convicted of conspiracy and perjury in the East 
Africa embassy bombings, sent encrypted e-mails to his associates in al Qaeda.  The Aum 
Shinrikyo cult, which gassed the Tokyo subway in March 1995, killing 12 people and injuring 
6,000 more, also used encryption to protect their computerized records, which included plans 
and intentions to deploy weapons of mass destruction in Japan and the United States.38
 
Although authorities successfully decrypted the evidence in the above cases, this is not always 
the case.  Further, when terrorists encrypt their communications, intelligence agencies may be 
unable to decrypt them fast enough to prevent a terrorist attack.  In addition, other security 
technologies such as steganography, which involves hiding the very existence of a message, 
often in an image, and the use of anonymity, can thwart authorities.  In February 2001, USA 
Today reported that according to U.S. and foreign officials, bin Laden associates were “hiding 
maps and photographs of terrorist targets and posting instructions for terrorist activities on sports 
chat rooms, pornographic bulletin boards, and other Web sites.” 39  However, their use of 
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steganography has not been confirmed and reports following the September 11 attacks indicated 
that at least the hijackers and their associates were sending their e-mail messages in the clear. 
 
Although information security technologies can foil counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism 
efforts, they also play a key role in protecting these and other activities, and in protecting critical 




If trends continue, the prognosis for the future is not encouraging.  We can expect to see more 
attacks, and more mass attacks.  In the area of e-mail viruses and worms alone, Message Labs, 
which observed an e-mail virus infection rate of 1 in 300 messages in 2001 (see above), forecast 
a possible rate of 1 in 100 in 2004, 1 in 10 in 2008, and 1 in 2 in 2013.  If that transpires, the 
Internet could become unusable.  
 
Many of the attacks will be financially motivated.  They will be the work of organized crime and 
lone criminals, as well as terrorist groups seeking to fund their activities.  The attacks may 
involve banking fraud, credit card fraud, extortion, stock manipulation, scams, and theft of 
intellectual property, all of which can be extremely costly.  Besides the direct and indirect costs 
to the victims, these crimes can undermine confidence in the Internet and e-commerce, 
ultimately impacting the economy.  
 
The vast majority of attacks may continue to be the work of teenagers and young adults, 
motivated more by thrill, curiosity, challenge, and bragging rights than by money or the desire to 
cause harm.  They may seek recognition in the hacking community or media attention.  They 
may use hacking as a means of protest, defacing Web sites and attempting to shut down the 
computers of their targerts.  Even those that not intend to be malicious, however, can cause 
serious harm.  Computer viruses and denial-of-service attacks especially can take a heavy toll on 
businesses and users. 
 
The more serious threats are generally considered to be cyber attacks conducted by nation states 
and terrorists.  With respect to the former, many governments have or are developing offensive 
information warfare programs.  Russia, China, and Iraq are often cited, but other countries, 
including the United States, have them as well.  Besides computer network attacks, these 
programs include other forms of information warfare, including psychological operations and 
perception management.  The general consensus is that a nation state with a well-developed 
computer network attack capability could potentially cause considerable damage to a target 
country’s critical infrastructures.  It might knock out power or the delivery systems for gas and 
oil, or shut down transportation or communications systems.  Even more damage could result 
from a combination of cyber and physical weapons. 
 
With respect to terrorists, less is known about whether and how they might pursue 
cyberterrorism.  In August 1999, the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Irregular Warfare at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California, issued a report that addressed the 
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demand side of terrorism.40  Specifically, they assessed the prospects of terrorist organizations 
pursuing cyberterrorism, which they defined as “unlawful destruction or disruption of digital 
property to intimidate or coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are political, 
religious, or ideological.” They concluded that the barrier to entry for anything beyond annoying 
hacks is quite high and that terrorists generally lack the wherewithal and human capital needed 
to mount a meaningful operation. Cyberterrorism, they argued, was a thing of the future, 
although it might be pursued as an ancillary tool. 
 
The NPS study examined five types of terrorist groups: religious, New Age, ethno-nationalist 
separatist, revolutionary, and far-right extremist.  Of these, only the religious groups were 
thought likely to seek the most damaging capability level, as it is consistent with their 
indiscriminate application of violence. 
 
In October 2000, the NPS group issued a second report following a conference aimed at 
examining the decision making process that leads sub-state groups engaged in armed resistance 
to develop new operational methods.41  They were particularly interested in learning whether 
such groups would engage in cyber terrorism.  In addition to academics and a member of the 
United Nations, the participants included a hacker and five practitioners with experience in 
violent sub-state groups.  The latter included the PLO, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelan 
(LTTE), the Basque Fatherland and Liberty-Political/Military (ETA-PM), and the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  The participants engaged in a simulation exercise based on 
the situation in Chechnya. 
 
Only one cyber attack was authorized during the simulation, and that was against the Russian 
Stock Exchange.  The attack was justified on the grounds that the exchange was an elite activity 
and thus disrupting it would not affect most Russians.  Indeed, it might be popular with Russians 
at large.  The group ruled out mass disruptions impacting e-commerce as being too 
indiscriminate and risking a backlash. 
 
The findings from the meeting were generally consistent with the earlier study.  Recognizing that 
their conclusions were based on a small sample, they concluded that terrorists have not yet 
integrated information technology into their strategy and tactics; that sub-state groups may find 
cyber terror attractive as a non-lethal weapon; that significant barriers between hackers and 
terrorists may prevent their integration into one group; and that politically motivated terrorists 
had reasons to target selectively and limit the effects of their operations, although they might 
find themselves in a situation where a mass casualty attack was a rational choice. 
 
The NPS group also concluded that the information and communication revolution may lessen 
the need for violence by making it easier for sub-state groups to get their message out.  
Unfortunately, this conclusion does not seem to be supported by recent events.  Many of the 
people in bin Laden’s network, including the suicide hijackers, have used the Internet but 




Although cyber terrorism is certainly a real possibility, for a terrorist, digital attacks have several 
drawbacks. Systems are complex, so controlling an attack and achieving a desired level of 
damage may be harder than using physical weapons. Unless people are killed or badly injured, 
there is also less drama and emotional appeal.  In addition, terrorists may be disinclined to learn 
and try cyber methods given the success they have had with bombs and other physical weapons.   
 
In assessing the threat of cyber terrorism, it is also important to look beyond the traditional 
terrorist groups, to those with considerable computing skills.  As noted at the beginning of this 
essay, some of these people are aligning themselves with terrorists like bin Laden.  While the 
vast majority of hackers may be disinclined towards violence, it would only take a few to turn 
cyber terrorism into reality. 
 
Further, the next generation of terrorists will grow up in a digital world, with ever more powerful 
and easy-to-use hacking tools at their disposal. They might see greater potential for cyber 
terrorism than do the terrorists of today, and their level of knowledge and skill relating to 
hacking will be greater.  Also, just as the September 11 suicide hijackers received flight training 
in American schools, terrorists could learn how to conduct cyber attacks through information 
security courses offered in the United States and elsewhere. 
 
Terrorists might also see benefits to conducting cyber attacks against critical infrastructures.  
Just as the physical attack against the World Trade Center severely impacted the financial and 
transportation sectors of the United States and elsewhere, so too might a cyber attack against 
critical computers supporting these sectors.  The potential seriousness of such an attack is made 
all the more apparent by the considerable resources that the U.S. government is allocating to 
cyber defense of critical infrastructures and by the attention in the press.  Terrorists have long 
targeted the infrastructure of countries, so a cyber attack may not be far fetched.  The Islamic 
extremist Ahmed Ressam, who attempted to place a bomb in the Los Angeles airport around 
January 1, 2000, testified that he was trained to target “such installations as electric plants, gas 
plants, airports, railroads, large corporations and military installations.” He said that he chose an 
airport because it is “sensitive politically and economically.”42  
 
Cyber terrorism could also become more attractive as the real and virtual worlds become more 
closely coupled, with automobiles, appliances, and other devices attached to the Internet. Unless 
these systems are carefully secured, conducting an operation that physically harms someone may 
be as easy as penetrating a Web site is today.   
 
Although there are no reports of al Qaeda conducting cyber attacks against critical 
infrastructures or teaching methods of cyber jihad in terrorist training camps, there are some 
indications that cyber terrorism is at least on their radar screen.  Following the September 11 
attacks, bin Laden allegedly told Hadmid Mir, editor of the Ausaf newspaper, that “hundreds of 
Muslim scientists were with him and who would use their knowledge in chemistry, biology and 




Further, in December 2001, Newsbytes reported that a suspected member of al Qaeda said that 
members of the terrorist network had infiltrated Microsoft and attempted to plant Trojan horses 
and bugs in the Windows XP operating system.44 According to the report, Mohammad Afroze 
Abdul Razzak told Indian police that the terrorists had gained employment at Microsoft by 
posing as computer programmers.  Microsoft responded by saying the claims were “bizarre and 
unsubstantiated and should be treated skeptically.”   
 
Regardless of whether the claim is true, the story is troubling for the simple reason that it shows 
that at least some terrorists are fully cognizant of the potential of cyber attacks and how such 
attacks can be launched with the aid of Trojan horses and insider access into the world’s 
dominant software producer.  By planting malicious code in the popular software, the terrorists 
could potentially steal sensitive information from Microsoft customers, including government 
agencies and operators of critical infrastructures, and use that information to facilitate physical 
or cyber acts of terror.  They could sabotage data or networks, causing potentially enormous 
losses.   
Although hijacked vehicles, truck bombs, and biological weapons still pose a greater threat than 
cyber terrorism, the events of September 11 caught us by surprise.  So too could a major cyber 
assault.  The severity of the attack could be amplified by combining it with a physical attack. For 
example, terrorists might jam 911 services or shut down electricity or telecommunications after 




On October 16, 2001, President Bush issued as Executive Order on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection in the Information Age.  The order established the President’s Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Board, and charged it to recommend policies and coordinate programs for protecting 
information systems for critical infrastructures.  It assigned several areas of activity to the Board, 
including outreach to the private sector and to state and local governments; information sharing; 
incident coordination and response; recruitment, retention, and training of Executive Branch 
security professionals; research and development; law enforcement coordination with national 
security components; international information infrastructure protection; legislation; and 
coordination with the newly formed Office of Homeland Security.  The Chair of the Board, 
designated Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security, reports to the Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs and to the Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security.  Richard Clarke, who was already coordinating critical infrastructure protection efforts 
for the Administration from his position in the National Security Council, was appointed Chair. 
 
Formation of the Board followed a series of initiatives begun by the Clinton Administration.  
These included the establishment of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, the recommendations of which led to Presidential Decision Directive 63.  PDD 63 
created the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) within the Department of Commerce 
and the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), housed at the FBI but with 
representatives from several agencies.  The CIAO was established to coordinate national 




The NIPC serves as a national critical infrastructure threat assessment, warning, vulnerability, 
and law enforcement investigation and response entity.  Its focus is as much on prevention as on 
investigation and response.  Towards that end, it issues security assessments, advisories, and 
alerts, the latter addressing major threats and imminent or in-progress attacks targeting national 
networks or critical infrastructures.  In partnership with the private sector, it has also established 
InfraGard chapters at all 56 FBI field offices.  The chapters provide formal and informal 
channels for the exchange of information about infrastructure threats and vulnerabilities. So far, 
over 2,300 organizations from industry, academia, and government have joined. 
 
PDD 63 also encouraged the private sector to create Information Sharing and Analysis Centers 
(ISACs) in cooperation with the government.  The centers would serve as the mechanism for 
gathering, analyzing, appropriately sanitizing, and disseminating private sector information 
related to infrastructure vulnerabilities, threats, and incidents.  So far, ISACs have been 
established for several sectors, including banking and finance, telecommunications (operated by 
the National Coordinating Center), electric power (operated by the North American Electric 
Reliability Council), oil and gas, and information technology.  In addition to the ISACs and 
InfraGard chapters, numerous other groups facilitate information sharing, including the 
CERT/CC and other computer emergency response teams, the Partnership for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, the High Tech Crime Investigators Association, the New York 
Electronic Crimes Task Force, the Joint Council on Information Age Crime, and the Center for 
Internet Security.  All of these efforts have helped strengthen the cyber defense and crime 
fighting capabilities of their members. 
  
One of the challenges facing all of these groups is that industry has been reluctant to share 
information out of concern for its confidentiality.  In particular, companies are concerned that 
sensitive information provided voluntarily might not be adequately protected, or that it could be 
subject to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests or lawsuits.  Industry is also concerned 
that cooperation with industry partners might violate antitrust laws.  Bills have been introduced 
in the House and Senate to provide limited exemption from FOIA and antitrust laws, but they 
might not go far enough.  Gary Fresen, an attorney working on information security issues, 
recommends giving companies a broader range of legal privileges consistent with that found in 
other industries such as healthcare, railroads, and environmental protection.  In addition to FOIA 
and antitrust protection, the privileges would include a peer group privilege, a self-audit 
privilege, and a reporting privilege.  Collectively, these would protect company sensitive 
information that is acquired during vulnerability testing or that is shared with industry groups 
from disclosure through lawsuits. 
 
The Department of Justice has launched several initiatives aimed at strengthening the cybercrime 
fighting capability of the criminal justice community.  The National Cybercrime Training 
Partnership provides guidance and assistance to local, state, and federal law enforcement 
agencies, with the goal of ensuring that the law enforcement community is properly trained to 
address electronic and high technology crime.  The Electronic Crimes Partnership Initiative is 
tackling a broader range of issues, including technology, technical assistance, legal and policy 
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issues, education and training, outreach and awareness, and standards and certification.  The 
partnership includes representatives from law enforcement, industry, and academia. 
 
The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOMM) has primary responsibility for 
computer network operations (CNO) within the military.  The Joint Task Force Computer 
Network Operations (JTF-CNO) within USSTRATCOMM serves as the operational component 
for all CNO, which includes both computer network defense (CND) and computer network 
attack (CNA).  In conjunction with the unified commands, services and DOD agencies, the JTF-
CNO coordinates and directs the defense of DOD computer systems and networks and 
coordinates and conducts computer network attacks. 
 
One of the difficulties facing both the public and private sector has been a shortage of people 
with expertise in information security.  To remedy that situation, the Clinton administration 
began the Federal Cyber Service Scholarship for Service program, which seeks to increase the 
number of qualified students entering the fields of information assurance and computer security 
and to increase the capacity of colleges and universities within the United States to produce 
professionals in these fields.  The program, which is administered by the National Science 
Foundation, offers scholarship and capacity building grants to universities.  Students receiving 
scholarships are required to work for a federal agency for two years as their federal cyber service 
commitment.  The NSF program ties in with another educational initiative operated by the 
National Security Agency.  Their program promotes higher education in information assurance 
and security by designating qualified institutions as Centers of Academic Excellence in 
Information Assurance.45  As of December 2001, 23 institutions had been so named. 
 
Research and development in information security technologies is also needed.  In addition to 
programs in the private sector, the National Science Foundation, Department of Defense, and 
other government agencies have R&D programs in information assurance and security.  Given 
that many if not most security incidents can be attributed to faulty passwords and a failure to 
install security patches, innovations in these areas, including the use of biometrics to replace 
passwords, better tools for tracking and patching vulnerabilities, and methods and tools for 
developing systems with fewer vulnerabilities, can have a large payoff.   
 
Increased customer demand has encouraged vendors of information technology to deliver 
products with better security than in the past.  Another incentive that could lead to better security 
is risk of exposure to liability lawsuits.  In this regard, the Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act (UCITA) could have exactly the opposite effect, by allowing software vendors 
to absolve themselves of liability through licensing agreements.  Fortunately, only two states 
passed the law.  However, the issue of product liability is difficult, because developing fault-free 
software is all but impossible.  Still, vendors should be liable for negligence, failure to use best 
practices in software development, and failure to respond to reported vulnerabilities in their 
products. 
 
Because cybercrimes often cross national borders, international cooperation in fighting these 
crimes is essential.  Toward that end, the Council of Europe has adopted a Cybercrime 
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Convention that aims to harmonize laws and address issues relating to mutual cooperation and 
evidence retention and sharing.  Unfortunately, industry and other interested parties were not 
brought into the process until the draft convention was nearly finished.  Although the final 
document resolved some of the issues raised relating to privacy and industry responsibilities and 
liabilities, others remained.  An important lesson from this is that the private sector should be 
involved in government efforts from the outset.  Fortunately, other government initiatives have 




Information and information technology is becoming more ubiquitous, mobile, vulnerable, and 
grounded in the physical world.  Security technologies are advancing, but so too are tools for 
hacking.  The net effect has been an increase in the number and magnitude of cyber attacks, with 
a corresponding increase in losses to their victims.  While few attacks have been attributed to 
terrorists or foreign governments, these threats are worrisome because of their potential to cause 
considerable damage, particularly if conducted against critical infrastructures.  The U.S. 
government, alongside industry and academia, has initiated several programs to strengthen our 
cyber defense capability and thereby mitigate this risk.  They are important steps forward. 
 
Considerable work, however, remains.  We need more complete data about cyber security 
incidents, including prevalence and cost data; data showing the correlation of incidents with 
operating modes and particular cyber defenses; and data showing the return on security 
investment for different approaches.  This data is essential so that companies know what works 
and where to focus limited resources.  We need to expand our education and research initiatives 
so that there are more people capable of defending our networks and better tools at their 
disposal, and so that new systems are designed with fewer vulnerabilities and mechanisms for 
limiting damages.  We need to extend our international initiatives so that cyber offenses can be 
successfully prevented, investigated, and prosecuted regardless of the locations of the 
perpetrators and victims.  Finally, we need to make sure that our laws and regulations promote 
information security and accountability without overburdening industry or sacrificing privacy.  
Achieving these goals will not be possible without extensive collaboration between the public 
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